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Mad or normal? 
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Aalborg Universitet
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Brinkmann, Svend (2017). ‘Mad or normal? Paradoxes of contemporary diagnostic 
cultures’ i Tidsskrift for Forskning i Sygdom og Samfund, nr. 26, 169-183.
Psychiatric diagnoses are increasingly used by people around the world as a filter through 
which they experience their sufferings, unhappiness, and eccentricities. In what can be cal-
led the diagnostic cultures of our times, more and more people receive a psychiatric diagno-
sis, something that is often criticized as unwarranted medicalization and pathologization of 
human problems. Psychiatric diagnoses also appear in popular media, and this paper seeks 
to unfold some paradoxes of our diagnostic cultures by using a Danish TV show called 
“Mad or normal?” as an instance that can inform us of larger cultural issues about how 
psychiatric problems are understood and addressed in public media today. The show had 
the ambition of combating stigmatization of psychiatric illness and disorder, but can be seen 
as reinforcing exactly that. The manifest messages of the show were that mental disorder is 
just like physical illness, that people can in fact recover, and that the mentally ill are “just 
like us”, but the set-up of the show latently worked against these messages, which is likely 
a more general problem in today’s diagnostic cultures. The question is asked whether such 
a show can be considered as a vehicle through which non-contagious psychiatric diagnoses 
can nonetheless become contagious in a way that involves the paradoxical logics that are 
pointed out.
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Introduction
To begin on the largest scale possible, the global cost of mental illness has been es-
timated at 2.5 trillion US dollars – a number that is expected to grow to a shocking 
6 trillion dollars by 2030 (Kincaid & Sullivan, 2014, p. 1). Many studies estimate 
that around 25 % of the population in Western countries will suffer from at least 
one mental disorder in the course of one year (e.g. Kessler, 2010). The estimated 
life time prevalence for any psychiatric disorder is usually set around 50 %. Ac-
cording to many psychiatrists, this shows that their discipline has progressed to a 
stage, where professionals are finally able to find, diagnose, and treat the mentally 
ill that have always existed. Perhaps, for a few disorders, there are more afflicted 
people than before, but overall, the argument goes that the difference between the 
old days and contemporary times is that we can now finally locate the disordered. 
Some sociologists argue on the contrary that these numbers are proof that modern 
life in fact creates new epidemics of social pathologies (Keohane & Petersen, 2013). 
Many more people are in fact mentally disordered than earlier because we live 
in disordered times (Petersen, 2011). Something has changed with the changing 
cultural landscape roughly after World War II, and the high prevalence numbers 
of depression, anxiety, ADHD etc. are a sign that something is deeply wrong in 
our culture. People in the West are today rarely dying because of material poverty, 
hunger or appalling physical working conditions – as in the times of Karl Marx 
– but they are suffering from various mental disorders, ranging from depression 
and anxiety to eating disorders and bipolar conditions, because of terrible and 
alienating social life circumstances.
Without completely discarding these interpretations, this article is based on 
the hypothesis that something else has been happening in recent years that may 
explain the changes: The development of, what I call diagnostic cultures (Brink-
mann, 2016). The concept of diagnostic cultures refers to the numerous ways that 
psychiatric categories are used by people – patients, professionals, and almost 
everyone else – to interpret, regulate, and mediate various forms of self-under-
standing and activity. Although psychiatry and psychology (e.g. psychoanaly-
sis) have been influential before, the diagnostic understanding is today almost 
everywhere in modern society. In recent years, diagnostic cultures have become 
manifest in schools, work life and homes, leading to a situation where people 
increasingly interpret their sufferings in the light of psychiatric conceptions and 
diagnostic terminology. Consequently, as critical social and cultural researchers, 
we can no longer, like the anti-psychiatric movement from the 1960s and 1970s 
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(beginning with Szasz, 1960), simply accuse psychiatrists of promoting “medicali-
zation from above” (saying that it is unidirectionally doctors and “the system” that 
stigmatize us as ill). Patients and citizens themselves are increasingly pushing for 
“pathologization from below”, seeking out diagnoses as explanations of various 
life problems and using the vocabulary of psychiatry as a preferred “language of 
suffering” (Brinkmann, 2014a), i.e., as a way of rendering meaning to experienced 
suffering. My point is that the recognition of the emergence of diagnostic cultures 
as a widespread and pervasive aspect of contemporary cultural life should lead us 
to discuss the prevalent explanations in a different light: The psychiatric (we can 
finally find the ill) and the sociological (modern society is the source of the rising 
prevalence of mental disorders). It is not that these arguments are faulty per se 
(indeed, both of them probably contain more than a grain of truth), but they might 
concern superficial aspects of a more profound historical and cultural develop-
ment in our very conceptions of deviance and suffering.
It is understandable that there is, in an individualized and secularized age, a 
felt need to explain one’s suffering, discomfort, and problems in psychiatric terms 
since older horizons of meaning related to religion, tradition, and community have 
been questioned (Healy, 2012). The main problem of the emerging diagnostic cul-
tures, however, might be that we risk losing vital resources of self-understanding 
if we continue to pathologize human suffering (Brinkmann, 2013). Existential, 
political, and moral concerns are easily transformed into individual psychiatric 
disorders, and we thereby risk losing sight of the larger historical and social forces 
that affect our lives (Conrad, 2007). It seems that we are today not only witnessing 
a “pathologization of the normal” – in the sense that diagnostic criteria and cate-
gories are constantly expanding to encompass evermore conditions that we used 
to think of as normal human conditions and reactions – but also a “normalization 
of pathology”, which means that we are no longer surprised or shocked when he-
aring about the disorders that people allegedly have. Paradoxically, it has become 
normal to be abnormal.
A whole new field is now developing in the social sciences to study the dif-
ferent kinds of impact that diagnoses have on sociocultural life, that is to say, the 
sociology of diagnoses (Jutel, 2011; Jutel & Nettleton, 2011). This field is primarily 
concerned with studies of how diagnoses are formulated and function to make 
the diffuse symptoms of people understandable, of how patient identities are for-
med around diagnoses, and of how patient organizations operate and fight for 
rights and recognition, for example. While being positioned on the fringe of this 
new field in the social sciences, the present article takes a more cultural approach 
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to study the role of diagnoses in the media and people’s everyday lives today. Con-
cretely, the goal in what follows is to analyze a TV show called “Mad or normal?” 
centered on psychiatric diagnoses that was aired on Danish television in 2012 and 
2014. The show was a Danish adaptation of the BBC program “How mad are you?” 
(see Progler, 2009, for a brief description and analysis from a medical science per-
spective)1. The reason for choosing this specific example is that it can hopefully 
lead to a way of opening up for a critical discussion of the problems of diagnostic 
cultures by focusing on how these cultural problematics become manifest in vari-
ous cultural productions and articulations.
The analysis in what follows can also be seen as part of the current social 
science interest in understanding how non-infectious (psychiatric) diagnoses and 
disorders can be communicable (Seeberg & Meinert, 2015). TV shows such as this 
mobilize significant cultural discourses about mental disorder and subsequent-
ly feed back into the public sphere, presenting viewers with symbolic resources 
for self-interpretation in a process that gives rise to what Ian Hacking has called 
looping effects of human (or interactive) kinds (Hacking, 1995b). Looping effects 
represent interactions between classified (in this case people with possible mental 
health problems) and classifications (in this case diagnoses) mediated by systems 
of experts, forms of knowledge and institutions within what Hacking calls an 
ecological niche (Tekin, 2014). Looping effects are dynamic in the sense that they 
(the effects) cannot be predicted in advance, but result from a process in which all 
elements are potentially transformed.
How can such looping effects in our diagnostic cultures be studied by looking 
at a single TV program? How can this help us understand what is more generally 
at stake in diagnostic cultures? The answer is that it is possible to open up for 
an understanding of general cultural processes of looping by focusing on, what 
Denzin (following Psathas) has called, “instances” (what follows is described in 
greater detail in Brinkmann, 2012). Denzin says that we should take “each instance 
of a phenomenon as an occurrence that evidences the operation of a set of cultural under-
standings currently available for use by cultural members.” (Denzin, 2001, p. 63). An 
instance is an occurrence that is evidence that “the machinery for its production 
is culturally available” (Psathas, quoted by Denzin, p. 63). When faced with an 
instance in this sense – such as a TV show – we should ask what makes it pos-
sible. What underlying logics are at work? This question invites us into abductive 
reasoning since we have a single instance that puzzles us, but which we believe 
contains larger cultural beliefs and processes in a condensed form. In order to ad-
dress the puzzle, we must employ abductive reasoning and employ what C. Wright 
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Mills called the sociological imagination (Mills, 1959). Abduction is a form of rea-
soning that we employ in situations of uncertainty; when we need an understan-
ding or explanation of something that stands out as puzzling or mysterious. It has 
recently been conceptualized as breakdown oriented research (Alvesson & Kär-
reman, 2011). Good social science frequently springs from a breakdown (“I don’t 
understand this”), coupled with a mystery (e.g. the framing of the breakdown as a 
riddle) and then a possible resolution of the riddle – for instance based on a novel 
perspective on the matter that confused the researcher. I have previously employ-
ed the interpretative abductive approach to analyze medialized representations of 
guilt (Brinkmann, 2010) and shame (Madsen & Brinkmann, 2012), and the present 
analysis is based on the same paradigm of analyzing TV materials abductively 
and letting oneself wonder how it has come to make sense, and then, following 
this breakdown in understanding, build a new understanding by seeing the in-
stance as symptomatic of larger cultural processes.
One final thing must be noted: The definition of ‘culture’ is notoriously tricky, 
but when I address “diagnostic cultures” in the present article, I do so from the 
perspective of cultural psychology, where ‘culture’ is taken to refer to semiotic 
and material mediators of human action in a broad sense (Brinkmann, 2016). That 
is, culture is not a variable, a context, or a place, but a way that humans relate to 
themselves, the world and others by using a range of mediators such as language 
and artefacts. Diagnostic cultures are thus sets of practices in which diagnostic 
categories play a significant role as mediators of action, thoughts, and feelings 
about life and suffering.  
A diagnostic quiz show: “Mad or normal?”
In 2012 the national Danish Broadcasting Company aired the documentary “Mad 
or normal?”2. The explicit idea was to challenge people’s biases about the mentally 
ill by showing that they are in most respects “just like you and me”. The show was 
run in an entertaining way, somewhat like a quiz, and hosted by a famous Danish 
“TV doctor”: Three experts (one psychiatrist, one psychologist and one psychiatric 
nurse) were confronted with a group of ten people they had not met before, and 
five of these people had different psychiatric diagnoses (in casu schizophrenia, ea-
ting disorder, OCD, social phobia and bipolar depression). Through the episodes, 
the experts were supposed to make a qualified guess and match the diagnoses 
with five of the participants. The viewers could also participate by voting on the 
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internet, trying to guess who among the participants were mentally ill. In order to 
help the experts (and also the viewers) in this guessing game, the participants had 
to go through a number of trials and tests that were supposed to provide clues as 
to who were ill and who were well. For example, the participants had to perform 
standup comedy in front of a live audience (the idea being that this would be diffi-
cult for someone with social phobia), and do a farm animal clean up task (possibly 
revealing the OCD sufferer because of her fear of filth). But in fact – and seemingly 
in line with the program’s hopes and intentions (at least the result was celebrated 
as a good thing) – the experts could not guess who were ill, or which diagnoses 
belonged with whom. And the viewers were also quite poor at the guessing game.
A book was published in continuation of the show – with same title (“Mad or 
normal?”) (Kyhn, 2012)  –  and, a couple of years later, in 2014, the show was fol-
lowed up with two new episodes called “Mad or normal? At the job interview”. In 
the second season it was instead of mental health professionals acting as experts, 
three business managers who were confronted with disguised psychiatric pa-
tients in a group of job applicants. They were asked, who among the participants 
they would be most likely to offer a job. And, interestingly, they were very positive 
toward many of the people with diagnoses, and the “winner” of the program was 
in fact a psychiatric patient.
In what follows I shall concentrate on the first season and highlight three dif-
ferent paradoxes inherent in the show, the first of which I call “One of us?”
One of us?
Both seasons of the show, including the second with its concrete theme of psychia-
tric diagnoses and work life, demonstrate one of the central paradoxes that I find 
inherent in our diagnostic cultures: On the one hand, it is surely very positive that 
people who are diagnosed are “one of us” (which was the name of the national 
campaign in Denmark that accompanied the TV show to raise public awareness 
about psychiatric disorders) to the extent that experts and business leaders cannot 
recognize them in a group of people (see Oute, Huniche, Nielsen & Petersen, 2015, 
for an analysis of the larger campaign). This can be seen as a demonstration that 
“they” are indeed “like us”. However, on the other hand, they are still “they”, and 
paradoxically included as excluded through the diagnostic label. Furthermore, the 
argument or demonstration of just-like-us-ness can quickly be turned on its head 
to become a demonstration that if “they” are “just like us”, then why do they need 
special welfare benefits, pensions, and other rights guaranteed by the state?
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The accompanying book in fact asks this question directly: “If the three experts 
in the program are incapable of guessing who among the ten participants suffer 
from which disorders, then how on earth should the rest of us be capable of gues-
sing it?” (Kyhn, 2012, p. 9; my translation). It might be a good thing that viewers 
discover that psychiatric patients are not dangerous, but in fact commonly nice 
people and, like most people in general, without visibly dramatic problems, but 
the downside is that it might at the same time become difficult for patients to ex-
plain and justify their sufferings to others within the context of a welfare society. 
This illustrates a broader dilemma concerning psychiatric diagnoses in our times: 
Diagnoses may be stigmatizing and pathologizing (and thus represent something 
one might wish to avoid), but, at the same time, the labelling they provide can give 
certain advantages in the diagnostic cultures of the welfare state. This dilemma is 
made visible in the TV show with its just-like-us discourse.
Just like somatic illness?
Another powerful discourse about mental disorder in the TV show – which is 
more generally advocated by many psychiatrists, researchers, and the psychopha-
macological industry – claims that a psychiatric problem is an illness “just like so-
matic illness”, as it is often said. The show and the accompanying book repeatedly 
use the term “mental illness”, and there is a constant comparison with visible 
somatic illness (especially fractured bones), which is allegedly easier to handle 
because of its visibility. In principle, the message is that there are no differences 
between somatic and psychiatric problems, and the two ought to be equal in the 
health care systems of the welfare state. Recently, in Denmark, a ”diagnosis gua-
rantee” has been established by the government, which means that patients have 
the right to obtain a diagnosis within one month after contacting the medical 
system. At first this guarantee did not pertain to psychiatric diagnoses, but from 
September 2015 this has been changed, so that all kinds of health problems are 
put on an equal footing. On the one hand, this can be seen as a very positive 
development guaranteeing the rights of the mentally ill, but, on the other, it has 
the downside that a diagnosis can be prematurely formulated and stigmatize the 
individual very quickly.
Alongside the explicit message of the show that mental disorder is just like 
somatic illness, the underlying logic of the show interestingly seems to go against 
this discourse of “illness equality”. This can be seen if one tries to imagine a si-
milar show with people suffering from somatic illnesses. Would such a show be 
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aired with the participants having to go through trials that would bring forth 
their symptoms? This is very unlikely. Think of people with osteoporosis being 
forced to play hockey, for example, or diabetes patients being asked to eat loads 
of sweets. But for some reason it does not lead to public outcry (in fact quite the 
opposite) that people with mental disorders engage in activities that are meant to 
disclose their illnesses and activate their symptoms. This can be said to reveal the 
contradictory understandings of psychiatric problems that we have in our diag-
nostic cultures: On the one hand, they are “just like somatic illnesses”, but, on the 
other, they are clearly thought of as something else at the same time.
Psychiatrists have had an interest in depicting mental disorder as equivalent 
to physical illness, and many patients and patient organizations accept and pro-
mote this agenda. They believe that a diagnosis can serve as an explanation of 
underlying pathology just as in cases of physical illness. However, here it is often 
overlooked that it is difficult within psychiatry to make the necessary distinction 
between disorder (or pathology) and symptoms. This is much easier with regard 
to somatic problems (a tumor is thus something different from the symptoms it 
may cause). Studies show that patients do in fact use diagnoses as explanations 
of their problems (Young, Bramham, Gray, & Rose, 2008). In a study of adults 
diagnosed with ADHD, I have also described some of the ways in which people 
use their diagnoses as explanations of their problems - even if the categories are 
not strictly speaking explanatory (Brinkmann, 2014b). No psychiatric diagnosis 
can be formulated on the background of biomarkers (e.g. blood samples or brain 
scans), but exclusively by counting and evaluating symptoms, for example as they 
appear on various symptom check lists. So if the diagnoses are used as explana-
tions, it becomes circular because the diagnosis is formulated with reference to 
problematic behaviors, and the same behaviors are explained with reference to 
the diagnosis. First, the person is identified (either by him or herself or others) 
as problematic, for instance because of impulsivity or inattention, and seeks help 
or gathers information from various sources (notably the internet). Second, if the 
problems are severe enough to count as symptoms of ADHD, for example, then 
this diagnosis is formulated to account for the problematic behaviors. Finally, if 
one asks how we know that ADHD is in fact the problem, the answer is that this 
is evident from the symptoms (Timimi, 2009). The symptoms thus warrant the 
diagnostic category that is in turn invoked to explain the symptoms in a circular, 
and ultimately empty, process. Interestingly, this ought to speak against a chro-
nification of the disorder (because when the symptoms disappear, so does the 
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disorder), but this is in fact much more complex, as we shall now see when turning 
to the third paradox.
Chronic or not?
Related to the point about just-like-somatic-illness, it was noteworthy that the 
people with diagnoses in the “Mad or normal?” program were said to be “not ill” 
at the time when the show was made. Of course for ethical reasons it seems reaso-
nable to only enroll people who are not overly vulnerable, which represents a sort 
of protection against the tests in the show, but, given this, it is hardly surprising 
that the experts and viewers were unable to guess who were suffering from the 
various mental disorders. Also in the book, which accompanied the TV show, we 
hear for example that Kirstine (diagnosed with OCD) “is now cured”, and she re-
fers to her remaining problems as “bad habits, which everybody has” (Kyhn, 2012, 
p. 46). Again, to compare with somatic illness: If someone had once suffered a frac-
ture, or had once had a tumor, which had been cured, then no one would ever ex-
pect that people (including medical experts) could come up with accurate guesses 
regarding these matters. So, returning to the first paradox, although the program 
meant to transmit the message that “they” are “just like us”, it paradoxically came 
to implicitly suggest that “once a psychiatric patient, always a psychiatric patient” 
– even when the symptoms have disappeared. The premise of the show was that it 
should be possible to guess the disorders even though the (former) patients were 
now symptom free, so, contrary to its surely good intentions, the show implicitly 
came to reinforce a discourse of chronicity concerning psychiatric problems.
This point relates to the overarching contradictory logics operating in the diag-
nostic cultures as we have seen: On the one hand, psychiatrists define and identify 
mental disorders on the basis of symptoms. This has been the case globally since 
1980 when DSM-II was replaced by DSM-III, and psychiatry moved away from its 
older aetiological approach, where psychiatrists had formulated diagnoses on the 
basis of the history, background, and personality of the patients. The current diag-
nostic psychiatry is instead based on an assessment of actual symptoms within a 
designated period of time (Horwitz, 2002). This means that a disorder or illness 
is equated with its symptoms. But, on the other hand, as we have also seen in the 
show, we have a widespread social representation (probably also among many 
psychiatrists) that mental disorders may somehow persist even in the absence of 
manifest symptoms. Otherwise the whole set-up of the show would hardly make 
sense.
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Diagnostic paradoxes: Summing up
What does a show like this tell us about the diagnostic cultures and our com-
plex cultural attitudes to mental illness today? Initially, it can be observed that a 
show like this would be quite unthinkable (at least in Denmark) just a few years 
ago. Psychiatric diagnoses were not publicly visible and would not be the center 
of attention in a popular entertainment show on TV. Superficially at least, this 
indicates that psychiatric problems are no longer taboo to the same extent as be-
fore and that stigmatization due to diagnoses might have decreased. Of course, 
it may also be related to a certain “sensationalism” concerning mental disorders, 
but the intentions of the show are explicitly to go against the tendency to separate 
“them” from “us”. To sum up, we have seen that a number of paradoxes are likely 
to emerge when dealing with psychiatric diagnoses today: (1) Through diagnoses 
psychiatric problems appear as “nothing special”, because many of us could be 
diagnosed – and yet normalizing the disorders may cause problems for people 
if it means that their problems cannot be recognized as sufficiently serious. (2) 
Through diagnoses psychiatric problems are addressed as medical problems – 
and yet they are simultaneously enacted as not just that. (3) Through diagnoses 
psychiatric problems are equated with manifest and sometimes transient symp-
toms – and yet diagnoses have a tendency to reinforce chronicity. Such paradoxes 
inherent in the logics of current diagnostic cultures might in themselves add to 
the suffering felt by those who live in these cultures and are diagnosed.
The medialized commodification of diagnoses
The fact that psychiatric diagnoses have entered the entertainment (or ‘edutain-
ment’) industry, in prime time on the largest TV station in Denmark, represents 
one significant aspect of our diagnostic cultures. More generally, people routi-
nely appear on various talk shows to talk about their psychiatric diagnoses, and 
celebrities also often come out and reveal that they suffer from some condition 
or other. There is little doubt that such pop cultural representations of psychia-
tric problems have a significant impact on how the phenomenon of psychiatric 
disorder is approached and talked about, contributing to the looping effects that 
Hacking has emphasized. This is a process that goes back and forth. In our mo-
dern medialized world, human experience is co-constructed through the stories 
that circulate in the different media and by the symbolic resources that are offered 
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there, which afford certain kinds of self-interpretation. Through the media, our 
social imaginaries are formed, and it is often through media stories that we are 
socialized into specific patterns of thinking and feeling – also concerning psychia-
tric problems. From a critical interpretative perspective, Denzin has outlined four 
goals of the mass media as an entire complex in our culture:
”The prime goals of the mass media complex are fourfold, to create audiences who 
(1) become consumers of the products advertised in the media, while (2) engaging 
in consumption practices that conform to the norms of possessive individualism en-
dorsed by the capitalist political system, and (3) adhering to a public opinion that is 
supportive of the strategic policies of the state […] The fourth goal of the media is clear, 
to do everything it can to make consumers as audience members think they are not 
commodities.”(Denzin, 2003, pp. 1000-1001).
According to this critical perspective, the mass media work by subjectifying 
people to think of themselves as consumers and even commodities, while simul-
taneously covering over this very function by making people believe that they are 
free to choose - in the present case between different understandings of psychia-
tric diagnoses. Relating Denzin’s observations to the ”Mad or normal?” show and 
the diagnostic cultures more broadly, we can say the following: Concerning the 
first point, psychiatric diagnoses can indeed be thought of as ‘products’ and pa-
tients as ‘consumers’. This is pushed in particular by the medical industry, which 
has an interest not only in selling drugs to help alleviate people’s symptoms, but 
also in “selling sickness” by making diagnoses publicly visible (Moynihan & Cas-
sels, 2005). This is one significant aspect of the looping effects, pace Hacking. If 
the industry succeeds in convincing doctors and patients that something is a dis-
order for which they have a remedy, then a market appears where the companies 
can sell their drugs. In the US, companies are even allowed to engage in Direct to 
Consumer Advertising (this was made legal in 1997, and New Zealand is the only 
other country in the world, where this is permitted), where the adverts often end 
with the message “Ask your doctor!”, whenever the troubled person can recog-
nize the advertised “symptoms”. But also the more subtle “product placement” 
of psychiatric diagnoses in the media is a significant component in the process of 
“selling sickness”. Although the TV show in Denmark was aired on a national and 
non-sponsored channel, highlighting the various diagnoses offers the viewers or 
consumers various ways of “performing” their disorders, as Emily Martin has put 
it (Martin, 2007); it gives them the possibility to begin “living under the descrip-
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tion” of the different diagnostic terms (Hacking, 1995a). However, we should also 
bear in mind that the possible positive side of this development is the form of de-
stigmatization that may occur when diagnoses enter the public sphere, in the best 
case reducing the taboo that traditionally have been attached to people’s mental 
problems in the imagined hemisphere of the West.
Concerning Denzin’s second point, the psychiatric diagnoses are generally 
reinforced by the popular media as belonging exclusively to the individual (cf. 
the notion of possessive individualism), even in cases when the representations 
have the intention of taking a de-stigmatizing approach to mental disorder such 
as in “Mad or normal?”. Even though social scientists will argue that what we call 
mental illness often results from problematic living conditions, it is, according to 
diagnostic psychiatry, the individual that “possesses” the problem, is diagnosed, 
and treated with drugs in the standard case (Kutchins & Kirk, 1997). Thus, a diag-
nostic approach to people’s problems risks hiding the social conditions of people’s 
sufferings, which is in line with the reigning neo-liberal order of making people 
responsible through the belief that they are free to choose (cf. Denzin’s third and 
fourth points cited above). It is noteworthy that the TV show did not include a 
discussion about changing life conditions (that could possibly explain the preva-
lence of mental disorder) or a critical awareness of the role of psychiatric diagno-
ses in human lives, including their possible pathologizing effects. The diagnoses 
were seen as referring solely to problems residing in individuals.
Conclusions
In this article, I have focused on merely one instance of the current diagnostic cul-
tures of a late-modern nation state such as Denmark. Although I have zoomed in 
on just one small example, I believe the concrete example displays some contradic-
tory or paradoxical logics that are operating on a much broader scale today. These 
logics put the notion of mental disorder in a precarious place – somehow between 
a “real” somatic illness and a construction – and also diagnosed individuals them-
selves, who are rarely just included in social arenas as legitimate patients, but 
almost always included as excluded. The contradictory nature of the diagnostic 
logics makes the looping effects between classified and classifications quite com-
plex. It is not simply the case that distressed individuals (e.g. some of the viewers 
of the TV show) learn how to designate their misery by appropriating a diagnostic 
vocabulary, but rather that they – in fact all of us who are exposed to a show like 
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”Mad or normal?” – learn that mental disorders are many things at the same time. 
What is communicated in the medialized processes of looping, then, are not just 
specific and discrete classifications, but an entire (complex and contradictory) way 
of thinking about human beings, their minds and their disorders. This has not 
been given much attention by Hacking (who has focused on specific categories 
such as autism, fugue and Multiple Personality Disorder), or most other observers 
of diagnostic cultures, but I hope that the small steps taken in the present article 
can contribute to an understanding not just of which categories that enter the loop-
ing games, but also of how and how much besides the categories themselves that is 
communicated. In short, a TV show like “Mad or normal?” can be seen as a vehicle 
through which non-contagious psychiatric problems can become contagious, but 
also communicates an entire view of diagnoses and problems as such. 
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Notes
1 Information on the Danish version can be found on the webpage of the natio-
nal Danish broadcasting company, a public service TV channel: http://www.dr.dk/
sundhed/Sygdom/Psykiatri/Psykiatri.htm
2 I provide a very brief analysis of the show in a text box in Brinkmann (2016), but 
here I have significantly revised and expanded the example.
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